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Chapter One
History and Psychology 
Three Weddings and a Future
Kenneth J. Gergen
Psychological science and historical scholarship have not always been congenial 
companions. For many historians, psychology has been a suspicious enterprise, an 
uneven fledgling in the intellectual world, disingenuously arrogating to itself the 
status of a natural science. Further, psychology’s implicit agenda is hegemonic. In the 
present case, if psychological science furnishes foundational knowledge regarding 
human behavior, and historical study is largely devoted to understanding just such 
conduct across time, then history stands to be absorbed by the science—ancillary 
and subsidiary. Psychology’s attitude toward history has been equally distant. As a 
child of cultural modernism, psychological science has treated historical inquiry with 
little more than tolerant civility. Psychology has been an enterprise struggling to 
develop general laws through scientific (and largely experimental) methods. Because 
of its newly fashioned commitment to empirical methods, preceding scholarship of 
the mind or scholarship about earlier mentalities was necessarily impaired. In an 
important sense, the past was a shroud to be cast away. Psychologists might scan 
historical accounts of earlier times in search of interesting hypotheses or anecdotes, 
but the results would most likely confirm the widely shared suspicion that contempo­
rary research—controlled and systematic—was far superior in its conclusions. From 
the psychologist’s standpoint, historians are backward looking, while the proper 
emphasis of research should be placed on building knowledge for the future.
Slowly, however, these disciplinary antipathies have begun to subside. With the 
emergence of new cultural topoi—globalization, ecology, information explosion, 
multiculturalism, and postmodernity among them—we encounter increased sensi­
tivity to the artificial and often obfuscating thrall of disciplinarity. Division and 
specialization are falteringly but increasingly replaced by curiosity, dialogue, and an 
optimistic sense of new and fascinating futures. It is with the shape of this future 
that the present chapter is concerned. A marriage of history and psychology can take 
many forms, and reflexive concern over their differing potentials and shortcomings 
is essential. It is not merely a matter of intellectual and scholarly promise; long­
standing traditions hang in the balance—to be strengthened or dissolved accord­
ingly. These traditions are further linked to broader societal practices of moral and
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political consequence. In choosing our mode of inquiry, so do we fashion a cultural 
future.
With these concerns in mind, I wish to consider three contrasting orientations to 
this blending of orientations: history as psychological expression, history as psycho­
logical progenitor, and psychological discourse as history. Wherever possible, we shall 
keep issues of the emotions in the foreground; however, where the literature directs 
us to other psychological states and conditions, we shall find that the conclusions are 
also relevant to the emotions. I will not pretend to be impartial in this analysis. 
Indeed, the issue of moral and political impartiality is central to the discussion. At 
the same time, I make no claims to clairvoyance in these matters. These remarks are 
not intended as conclusive—the end of the conversation—so much as invitations to 
collective reflection on the building of a viable future.
History as Psychological Expression
My chief concern in the present analysis is the set of assumptions traditionally 
grounding central inquiry in both the psychological and historical domains. These 
assumptions, I will argue, while inviting certain forms of communication between 
history and psychology, are also problematic and delimiting in significant respects. 
Further, within certain forms of historical psychology, these assumptions are giving 
way to significant alternatives. For many, these latter developments represent im­
portant threats to the relevant disciplines. However, as I shall argue, these threats are 
more than offset by the manifold advantages, both to historical/psychological study 
and for societal life more generally.
Let us briefly consider several pivotal assumptions that traditionally conjoin these 
domains. I shall not lay out the terrain in any detail in this essay, as the assumptive 
paradigm is well elaborated within twentieth-century philosophy of science (as 
emerging within 1920s positivism and extending through logical empiricism to the 
Popperian extenuations in critical rationalism), and deeply embedded as an implicit 
forestructure within the everyday activities of scholars and scientists themselves. 
Briefly to recapitulate four of the central working assumptions within vast sectors of 
the disciplines today, we find commitments to the following:
1. An independent subject matter. Until recent years, historians and psychologists 
have virtually assumed the existence of their subject matters independent of the 
particular passions and predilections of the inquiring agent. This obdurate subject 
matter—given in nature—is there to be recorded, measured, described, and ana­
lyzed. Experience of this subject matter may serve as an inductive basis for the 
generation of knowledge or understanding. Contrasting accounts of the world may 
be compared against the range of existents to determine their relative validity.
2. An essentialist view of mind. Historians have largely joined psychologists in 
presuming that among the important subject matters to be explored are specifically 
mental processes, their antecedents and manifestations. Because human action is 
based on a psychological substratum (including, for example, emotion, thought, 
intention, and motivation), an illumination of psychological functioning is essential
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■for historical knowledge (lest history become a mere chronicle of events). Mental 
process is the pivotal focus of psychological science.
3. Understanding as objective and cumulative. Psychologists have expended great 
effort to insure the objective assessment of their subject matter. Instrumentation, 
computer control, experimental design, and test validation studies are only a few of 
the safeguards to objectivity. Although few historians would claim the world of the 
past to be transparent, most would agree that through the examination of manu­
scripts, letters, diaries, and other artifacts, one can construct accounts of the past 
that shed increasing light on the actual occurrences. Objective understanding may 
not be fully achievable, but the goal can be approximated in ever advancing degree. 
Further, in both disciplines objectivity serves as the foundation for cumulative 
knowledge. With increasing study of a given phenomenon—whether psychological 
depression or the Great Depression—scholars can achieve more fully detailed under­
standing.
4. Value neutrality. The pervasive tendency in historical and psychological inquiry 
has been a claim to ideological nonpartisanship. To be sure, scholars and scientists 
may harbor strong personal values, but these should in no way influence the assaying 
of evidence or the resulting account of the subject matter. The quest for objectivity 
in both cases is simultaneously linked to a belief in objectivity as liberation from 
ideology.
In large measure, these shared assumptions are also responsible for the emergence 
of a small but robust movement toward a historical psychology. Given broad 
agreement in metaphysical assumptions, a variegated range of exciting and challeng­
ing explorations into the interrelations between psychological process and historical 
change has emerged. It will be useful for the present analysis to draw several of these 
enterprises into focus, and then to examine several problematic implications. With 
these issues in place, we can turn to two further developments that offer alternative 
weavings of the historical and the psychological.
Assumptions in Action: Historical Psychology
As indicated, the assumptions outlined here essentially prefigure the dominant 
postures of inquiry. If we presume the existence of psychological process (entities, 
mechanisms, dispositions, etc.), along with an objectified historical context (that is, 
a context that exists independently of mental representation), then we are disposed 
to analyses that causally link mental predicates with historically specific events or 
actions. Two major forms of inquiry are favored: the first illuminating psychological 
origins of historically located actions, and the second focused on the psychological 
outcomes of specific historical conditions. While interactions between psychological 
and historical conditions are rare but noteworthy, most research tends to favor one 
of these causal sequences or the other. In the case of psychological origins, perhaps 
the premier efforts have been those of psychohistorians (see, for example, DeMause, 
1982; Loewenberg, 1983; Brown, 1959), who typically presume the existence of various 
psychodynamic processes and focus analysis on the ways these processes manifest 
themselves in various historical events. Such analyses may consider the psychody-
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namic conditions of people at a given era of history (for example, Fromm, 1941), or 
the individual psychology of significant historical figures (for example, Erikson, 
1975). While Martindale’s work (especially 1975,1990) on psychological motives giving 
rise to aesthetic appreciation and interests places primary stress on the mind as origin 
of history, his work is especially interesting in demonstrating that psychological states 
create context effects that loop back to alter their own character. Thus, for Martindale 
there are predictable historical trajectories derived from psychohistorical interactions.
Increasingly prevalent, however, is research in which mental states and expressions 
are positioned as effects of particular historical conditions. This work does not 
propose that psychological processes are products of these conditions; rather, the 
analyst presumes the existence of fundamental psychological processes (e.g., cogni­
tive, emotional, motivational, etc.), and views the historical context as shaping their 
content, character, or expression. In effect, we might say, there is a historical texturing 
of the psychological. Work of this sort has sprung from many sources. There has 
been a long-standing concern, for example, with the ways processes of child develop­
ment are situated within particular historical milieus (Aries, 1962; van den Berg, 1961; 
Kessen, 1990). Wide-ranging works such as those of Elias (1978) on the civilizing 
process, Ong (1982) on forms of cognition favored by oral as opposed to print 
cultures, and Elder (1974) on the psychological effects of the Great Depression also 
stand as important contributions to this form of inquiry. Researchers such as Simon- 
ton (1984, 1990) have even attempted to generate means of quantifying historical 
variables so as to predict historically specific levels of creativity, genius, or leadership. 
Perhaps the most extensive and concerted work within this domain has been that of 
Stearns and Stearns, including their history of anger in the American context (Stearns 
and Stearns, 1986), the evolution of jealousy in recent history (Stearns, 1989), and the 
fate of Victorian passions in twentieth-century life (Stearns, 1994). Further exemplars 
of inquiry in these various domains is contained in the volume Historical Social 
Psychology (Gergen and Gergen, 1984).
Approaching the Limits of the Tradition
As we find, each of the traditional assumptions outlined earlier is clearly manifest 
in these lines of inquiry. Each presumes the independent existence of its subject 
matter, the psyche as a “natural kind” available to scientific appraisal, research as 
objective and cumulative, and the research enterprise not itself ideologically invested. 
A significant enrichment of understanding has resulted from the pursuit of these 
assumptions, including among them the very development of the social/behavioral 
sciences as significant disciplines on the cultural landscape; an emerging sense of 
unity in questions of knowledge, its importance, and how it is to be pursued and 
taught; and an enormous body of inquiry serving to stimulate the intellect, the 
imagination, and public practice. Yet while there is much to be said for these 
endeavors, it is also important to realize their limitations. That we should applaud 
the traditional efforts is not in question; whether a single paradigm should suffice is 
yet another matter.
Three critical issues demand attention in the present context. At the outset, it is
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important to realize that the assumptions giving rise to this form of inquiry are 
themselves derived from a historically situated intelligibility. The assumptions as 
articulated give the impression of “first principles,” foundations that transcend 
historical and cultural context. Yet the historically sensitive analyst will draw atten­
tion to the social conditions under which these assumptions emerged, and the part 
they may have played within the political and economic context of the time. The 
“grounding” assumptions, then, derive their legitimacy not from transcendent veri­
ties but from specific conditions of society. And if this is so, then there is no binding 
necessity for maintaining them to the exclusion of others. Or more positively, because 
they are optional they may be opened to broad-ranging scrutiny and alternatives 
invited.^
Such scrutiny begins in earnest when it is realized that these pivotal assumptions 
furnish no means of critical self- reflection. Once they are set in motion, there are 
no means of questioning their premises or intelligibly raising questions falling 
outside the ontology they circumscribe. Once it is agreed that knowledge is accumu­
lated through empirical assessment of the world’s givens, it is difficult to challenge 
this assumption. To question it on grounds that did not assume the ontology (e.g., 
on spiritual grounds) would be irrelevant to the venture (e.g., “mere mysticism”). To 
put empiricism to empirical test would be equally problematic. It would be concep­
tual mischief to suppose that empirical methods could prove themselves untrue.
Yet the problem is not limited to an incapacity for self- reflexivity. As we find, 
once the paradigm is in motion, all questions falling outside the bounded domain of 
empirical knowledge are placed in jeopardy. In particular, critics have long been 
concerned with the inability of the traditional orientation to speak to questions of 
human value. Because the language of value cannot unequivocally be linked to events 
in the material world, issues of value have been largely removed from discussion. 
Further, the pursuit of knowledge is concerned with establishing what is (or was) the 
case, it is said, and not with promulgating a canon of “oughts.” Objective inquiry is 
not in the business of ideological propaganda. Yet, as critics insist, in his or her 
choice of descriptive terminology, explanatory base, method of exploration, and 
rationalizing metaphysics, the scientist/scholar is also acting in the world and inevita­
bly shaping its future for good or ill. In spite of erstwhile claims to value neutrality, 
then, traditional research pursuits are inevitably ideological. Means must be found, 
it is argued, to restore a sense of moral and political responsibility to such endeavors.
There is a final issue, less profound in implication, but nonetheless significant. 
This concerns the tensions inhering in the dominant traditions of history and 
psychology, and the ways they are resolved within various forms of interdisciplinary 
work. Of particular concern, psychological study has generally, though not exclu­
sively, been a generalizing discipline. That is, the chief attempt is to establish knowl­
edge of human functioning that transcends both time and culture. In contrast, most 
(but not all) historical analysis has tended to be particularizing, concerned with the 
unique configuration of circumstances existing at different periods of time. In terms 
of our preceding discussion, these differences in propensity are not without political 
significance. For the generalizing disciplines, a conception of human nature as 
relatively fixed (of genetic origin) tends to prevail. Thus, there is a preference for
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explaining various social ills (e.g., aggression, poverty, drug use) in terms of individ­
ual, inherent tendencies, with an associated preference for strong state controls and 
political conservativism. (“One cannot change human nature, but only control its 
excesses.”) For the particularizing scholar, the tendency is to view human nature as 
more mutable and multi-potentiated. Societal problems are more likely to be under­
stood in terms of the particular configuration of circumstances (e.g., economic, 
attitudes and values, quality of governance), with policy solutions favoring collabora­
tion and creativity over control and punishment.
In this context we find that many of the efforts just described, in their assumption 
of human action as an effect or expression of a fixed psychological substrate, will 
tend to privilege the universal over the particular. The existence of the emotions, for 
example, is never doubted; their expressions and effects essentially constitute the 
historical. Such expressions may be controlled, channeled, or suppressed, but the 
fundament remains fixed. Thus, psychological process remains a prevailing force in 
the generation of historical events, and the history of psychological processes can be 
written only in terms of the variations on the fundamental theme. We can appreciate 
these contentions more fully by contrasting this initial orientation with a second.
The Historical Constitution of the Psyche
In important respects, the second line of psychohistorical inquiry represents a more 
extreme version of the texturing approach just discussed. However, rather than the 
historical context serving to give content or conditions of expression to an otherwise 
fixed domain of psychological functioning, here we find that the historical constitutes 
the mental. That is, mental processes—both the ontology of the mind and the 
specific manifestations—are by-products of antecedent historical conditions. These 
conditions may be material: for Marxist historians, psychological conditions of self­
alienation and false consciousness are the specific outcome of conditions of labor. 
The reconfiguration of labor would essentially eradicate these particular states of 
mind. For the most part, however, scholars have looked to the social conditions as 
the primary formative agents of psychological process.
This approach has been most inviting for a range of psychological states that are 
either marginal or controversial to the society more generally. Thus we are not at all 
discomforted by accounts of the social history of romantic love (for example. Hunt, 
1959; Kern, 1992). Possibly because many feel uncertain that they never have or will 
experience such a state, and possibly because romantic love is essentially problematic 
to an Enlightenment ideal of a rational and objective functioning of the mind, there 
is a certain relief attendant on such historization.
However, the intellectual and ideological stakes are raised considerably when such 
analysis turns to psychological predicates more pivotal to our public institutions. For 
example, the radical implications of Lev Vygotsky’s (1978) views on human develop­
ment have not been lost on the professional psychologist. For Vygotsky, “There is 
nothing in mind that is not first of all in society” (142). In effect, for Vygotsky the 
processes of thinking and memory are not there in nature, prior to culture, but owe
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their very existence to cultural antecedents. At the same time, this view serves as a 
strong invitation to historical analysis. The periodist may attempt to locate unique 
psychological states resonating with the configuration of cultural conditions domi­
nant at a given time. Exemplary is Badinter’s (1980) analysis of the mother’s “instinc­
tive” love for her child, its genesis traced to particular political and intellectual 
conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. My own work (Gergen, 1991) 
attempts to link various senses of self (as variously possessing a deep interiority, 
unity) to earlier eras, and argues for the contemporary (postmodern) erosion of this 
sensibility. Harre and Finlay-Jones’s (1986) explorations of accidie and melancholy in 
the early European context are also apposite. Although cross- cultural in its focus. 
Lutz’s work on the social constitution of emotions such as fago and song in the Ifaluk 
people of the southwest Pacific is highly compelling. Contributions to Harre’s (1986) 
edited collection. The Social Construction of Emotions, add important dimension to 
the form of study.
It is noteworthy that most of the research on the sociohistorical constitution of 
mind has not been carried out hy «mpirically oriented psychologi.s|:s. This is perhaps 
not surprising, inasmuch as the implications of such work for traditional empirical 
psychology are little short of devastating. At the outset, such inquiry challenges the 
essentialism so endemic to psychological science, and so necessary to its claims to be 
studying “universal man.” Not only is the search for transhistorical and transcultural 
generalizations thrown into question, but the very assumption of the science as 
cumulative is jeopardized. Today’s empirical results, on this account, are indicators 
not of universal truths, but of historically contingent customs (see Gergen, 1994a). 
Or in terms of our previous concerns, this form of analysis reverses the privilege of 
the psychological over the historical. Here psychology becomes a tributary of histori­
cal analysis.
When their implications are extended, such analyses also favor a self-reflexive 
posture. This is primarily so because the analyst comes to appreciate the historical 
contingency of the very conceptions of human knowledge giving rise to historical 
study itself. For example, if mentalities are socially constituted, what are we to make 
of the concept of objectivity as state of mind, and the assumption of an unbiased 
relationship between a private subjectivity and the objects of study? The very idea of 
a mind separate from the world, existing within the body, and reflecting the contours 
of an external world becomes open to historical reflection (see, for example, Rorty, 
1979). If subjectivity is socially constituted, then isn’t all scientific description and 
explanation colored by (if not derivative of) the community conventions of the time? 
A space is opened, then, for self-reflexive dialogue.
Further, a view of minds as historically constituted begins to generate a moral and 
political sensitivity. In particular, if the mental is socially constituted, then forms of 
psychological being are essentially optional. And if they are optional, we may inquire 
into the desirability of existing modes of being, and the potentials inherent in 
potential alternatives. To illustrate, Averill (1982) argues for anger as a form of 
culturally situated performance. Anger in Western culture, for example, is not dupli­
cated elsewhere, and what we might wish to term anger in many other cultures 
scarcely resembles what we take to be anger in our own. Under these circumstances.
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we in contemporary Western culture can raise questions about the desirability of our 
current construction of anger. Based on this premise, Tavris (1982) argues for a 
transformation in our cultural constructions, so as to reduce family violence and 
other crimes of aggression. More recently, Averill and Nunley (1992) extend these 
arguments to propose that people should create the emotional forms essential for 
fulfilling lives.
Finally, we find in this orientation the seeds for a dramatic recasting of the role of 
historian in matters of psychology. As we found in the preceding analysis, once 
mentalities are objectified, they will tend to make pivotal demands on all his­
torical analysis. However, if the mental world is historically constituted, then histori­
cal understanding is essential to any further analysis of mind. The work of the 
historian becomes a necessary prolegomenon for further understanding in psycho­
logical science. To launch research into any psychological “phenomenon” without a 
grasp of the textual history giving rise to the very presumption of a phenomenon 
would be cavalier, to say the least. To carry out research without a sense of the 
sociocultural forestructure that sets the limits of the project’s intelligibility would be 
myopic.
In spite of the profound implications of inquiry into the historical constitution of 
the psyche, it must be said that its practitioners have not typically been among the 
most active in pressing forward its more radical implications. In spite of the tensions, 
most of this work has proceeded within the traditional metatheoretical thrall. Prac­
titioners have primarily set out to do illuminating historical work, justified in 
terms of its evidential base and without a particular ethico-political agenda. Such 
provocation is saved for a third form of psychohistorical inquiry.
Psychological Discourse in Historical Context
The most recent turn in scholarship is a dialogic companion to an array of interre­
lated movements recently sweeping the humanities and social sciences more broadly. 
These movements—variously indexed as poststructural, post-empiricist, post-foun- 
dational, post-Enlightenment, and postmodern—all tend to converge in their con­
cerns on the construction of meaning through language and within community. That 
is, in varying ways they draw attention to the multiplicity of ways differing commtnli- 
ties construct, typically in language, a local sense of the real and the good. Further, 
as it is commonly argued, because such constructions create and sustain particular 
forms of conduct, they simultaneously operate as forces of control or power within 
society. Most pointedly, as it is proposed, those standing at the margins of such 
communities may become subject to what, for them, are oppressive if not annihilative 
consequences of construction.^
These have been stirring if not dramatic dialogues, and their implications far- 
reaching. Of particular relevance to the present chapter, they have stimulated an 
alternative from of scholarship, devoted in this case to the historical and cultural 
circumstances giving rise to particular vocabularies in the ordering of social conduct. 
The argument here is not that mental events are socially constituted, as in the
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previous case. For most of these scholars the existence of mental life itself is undecid- 
able. That is, whether or not there is “mental life” and how (if it exists) it is 
constituted are not questions generally felt to be answerable outside the confines of a 
particular interpretive community. The major concern, then, is with the discourses 
of mental life, people’s actions made apparent or possible through such discourses, 
and the functioning of these discourses (and associated actions) within society over 
time.
Emotions as Discourse: An Illustration
To convey the logic of this work, I will illustrate with the discourse of the 
emotions. Attempts to define the emotions and elucidate their character have orna­
mented the intellectual landscape for over two thousand years. Two characteristics 
of this continuing colloquy are particularly noteworthy: first, the presumption of 
palpability, and second, the interminability of debate. In the former case, until the 
present century there has been little doubting the obdurate existence of the emotions. 
In the second book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguished among fifteen emotional 
states; Aquinas’s Summa theologiae enumerated six “affective” and five “spirited” 
emotions; Descartes distinguished among six primary passions of the soul; the 
eighteenth-century moralist David Hartley located ten “general passions of human 
nature”; and the major contributions by recent theorists, Tomkins (1962) and Izard 
(1977), describe some ten distinctive emotional states. In effect, in Western cultural 
history there is unflinching agreement regarding the palpable presence of emotional 
states.
At the same time, these deep ontological commitments are also matched by a 
virtual cacophony of competing views on the character of the emotions—their 
distinguishing characteristics, origins, manifestations, and significance in human 
affairs. For Aristotle the emotions constituted “motions of the soul”; for Aquinas the 
emotions were experienced by the soul, but were the products of sensory appetites; 
Descartes isolated specific “passions of the soul,” these owing to movements of the 
“animal spirits” agitating the brain. For Thomas Hobbes (1651), the passions were 
constitutive of human nature itself, and furnished the activating “spirit” for the 
intellect, the will, and moral character. In his Treatise on Human Nature (1739), David 
Hume divided the passions into those directly derived from human instinct (e.g., the 
desire to punish our enemies), and those that derive from a “double relation” of 
•sensory impressions and ideas. A century later, both Spencer’s Principles of Psychology 
and Darwin’s Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals attempted to place the 
emotions on more seemingly certain biological grounds.
This interminability of debate is most effectively illustrated when we consider the 
“object of study” itself, that which is identified as an emotion. For example, Aristotle 
identified placability, confidence, benevolence, churlishness, resentment, emulation, 
longing, and enthusiasm as emotional states no less transparent than anger or joy. Yet, 
in their twentieth-century exegeses, neither Tomkins (1962) nor Izard (1977) recog­
nizes these states as constituents of the emotional domain. Aquinas believed that 
love, desire, hope, and courage were all central emotions, and while Aristotle agreed in
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the case of love, all such states go virtually unrecognized in the recent theories of 
Tomkins and Izard. Hohbes identified covetousness, luxury, curiosity, ambition, good 
naturedness, superstition, and will as emotional states, none of which qualifies as such 
in contemporary psychology. Tompkins and Izard agree that surprise is an emotion, 
a belief that would indeed surprise most of their predecessors. However, whereas 
Izard believes that sadness and guilt are major emotions, they fail to qualify in 
Tompkins’s analysis; simultaneously, Tompkins sees distress as a central emotion, 
while Izard does not.
There is a certain irony inhering in these two features of emotional debate, 
palpability and interminability. If the emotions are simply there as transparent 
features of human existence, why should univocality be so different to achieve? Broad 
agreement exists within scientific communities concerning, for example, chemical 
tables, genetic constitution, and the movements of the planets; and where disagree­
ments have developed, procedures have also been located for pressing the nomencla­
ture toward greater uniformity. Why, then, is scientific convergence so elusive in the 
case of emotions? At least one significant reason for the continuous contention 
derives from a presumptive fallacy, namely, Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concrete­
ness. Possibly we labor in a tradition in which we mistakenly treat the putative objects 
of our mental vocabulary as palpable, whereas it is the names themselves that possess 
more indubitable properties. Because there are words such as love, anger, and guilt, 
we presume that there must be specific psychological states to which they refer. And 
if there is disagreement, we presume that continued study of the matter will set the 
matter straight. After two thousand years of debate on the matter, one is ineluctably 
led to suppose that there are no such isolable conditions to which such terms refer.
This latter possibility has become more compelling within recent years, and 
particularly with the development of ordinary language philosophy. Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations was the major stimulus in this case, both questioning the 
referential base for mental predicates and offering an alternative way of accounting 
for such discourse. As Wittgenstein (1953) asks, “I give notice that I am afraid.—Do 
I recall my thoughts of the past half hour in order to do that, or do I let a thought of 
the dentist quickly cross my mind in order to see how it affects me; or can I be 
uncertain of whether it is really fear of the dentist, and not some other physical 
feeling of discomfort?” (sze). The impossibility of answering such a question in 
terms of mental referents for the emotion demands an alternative means of under­
standing mental terms. This understanding is largely to be found in Wittgenstein’s 
arguments for use-derived meaning. On this view, mental predicates acquire their 
meaning through various language games embedded within cultural forms of life. 
Mental language is rendered significant not by virtue of its capacity to reveal, mark, 
or describe mental states, but by its function in social interchange.
Historicizing Psychological Discourse: Instances and Implications
Arguments of the preceding kind inform a genre of historical work concerned not 
only with emotion, but also with the full range of discourses on the nature of psycho­
logical functioning. The focus of inquiry is variously on the genesis and sustenance df
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psychological discourse, its modes of functioning within society, and the values and 
groups that it sustains (and suppresses). Illustrative are Suzanne BCirschner’s (1996) ex­
ploration of the way contemporary conceptions of psychological development echo 
the narratives of neo-Platonist theological texts; David Leary’s (1990) edited collection 
on the place of metaphor in the history of psychological theorizing; Gigerenzer’s (1991) 
analysis of the influence of statistical methodology on psychology’s emerging concep­
tion of cognitive functioning; Hacking’s (1995) Rewriting the Soul, a historical inquiry 
into the conceptions of multiple personality and the politics of memory; Spacks’s 
(1995) exploration of the emergence of boredom in the eighteenth century; and Her­
man’s (1992) inquiry into the political roots of the discourse of psychic trauma. A 
broad sampling of historical work on psychological discourse is also contained in His­
torical Dimensions of Psychological Discourse (Graumann and Gergen, 1996).
This latter work begins to form a significant alternative to the stance of value 
neutrality pervading both the preceding psychohistorical enterprises. That is, rather 
than simply reflecting on the nature of the past, these latter inquiries use historical 
work in the service of moral/ethical critique with the aim of altering the shape of 
cultural action. This kind of value-based analysis is specifically invited by the as­
sumption that what we take to be human action is neither given as an essence nor 
fixed within individuals as cultural disposition; rather, human action is woven into 
the fabric of discursive understandings. Thus, if the scholar can alter such forms of 
understanding—as in the case of the historicization of psychological discourse— 
then we enter a clearing in which choice is possible. To understand that the psycholo­
gist’s conceptions of emotion, for example, are not maps of human nature but,,the 
outcomes of cultural tradition enables us to reflect on the relative value of these 
conceptions in comparison with other possibilities. The discourse is not fixed, but is 
rendered optional. Particularly illustrative of these concerns are Rose’s (1985, 1990) 
Foucauldian explorations of the role of the discourse and methods of professional 
psychology in the political “disciplining” of the society; Lutz’s (1988) critique of the 
androcentric biases fostered by the discourse of emotions in contemporary Western 
culture; and Sampson’s (1988) analysis of the individualist ideology sustained by 
emerging conceptions of mental life.
The implications of this growing corpus of work for more traditional historical 
and psychological inquiry seem, at the outset, little short of annihilative. From the\ 
discursive perspective, it is difficult to locate a subject matter that is independent of 
the discursive/theoretical projects of the investigating agents. The very idea of an 
“independent subject matter”—whether the mind or history itself—lapses into 
incoherence. And with this turn, of course, so do essentialist conceptions of mental 
events or processes. If anything, these inquiries demonstrate the tenuous (if not 
tautological) relationship between our language of the mind and its putative refer­
ents. Further, the aspiration for an objective science/history begins to whither. Yes, 
the sense of objectivity may be achieved within a particular community of interlocu­
tors. However, the scientist/scholar loses the warrant for claiming truth beyond 
community, some privileged relationship between words and world. Similarly, knowl­
edge may accumulate, but only by virtue of the standards shared within an interpre­
tive community.
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Yet in the end, the annihilative implications of these arguments cannot be sus­
tained. Should the discursive critic make claims to the truth of his/her critique, then 
the very grounds from which they issue are removed. More positively, this is to say 
that discursive inquiry does succeed in avoiding the pitfalls of gainsaying its own 
rationale. Whereas traditional inquiry has no means of questioning its own premises 
(e.g., presumptions of objectivity, value neutrality), the discursive scholar is invited 
into a posture of humility. Thus, the discursive critique of the traditions must itself 
be viewed as a discursive move, a means of carrying on intellectual life within the 
scholarly community, and relating this community to the broader society. The 
arguments essentially serve as an invitation to forms of conversation and relationship 
that may offer new alternatives for inquiry and new roles for the scholar.
Finally, we find that from the discursive perspective, neither psychology nor 
history is furnished an ultimate explanatory privilege. Neither psychological nor 
historical events are celebrated as the generative sources of action. In the discursive 
account, psychological processes are bracketed, thus seeming to give explanatory 
privilege to historical analysis. At the same time, one might counter that discourse 
analysis now replaces mental states as the central focus of historical analysis. How­
ever, because psychological discourse is integral to (and not separated from) social 
process, it is neither a cause nor an effect of social pattern. In effect, discourse both 
constitutes and is constituted by the historically located conditions of the culture. ; 
Neither mind nor material are paramount. *
History and Psychology: Is There a Future?
We have surveyed three significant departures in the marriage of historical and 
psychological scholarship, the first drawing on traditional essentialist assumptions 
regarding both history and psychology, the second emphasizing the historical consti­
tution of the psychological domain, and the third transforming both history and 
psychology to discourse. How should we now regard these ventures in terms of 
future investments? Should the traditional endeavors, still very robust, simply con­
tinue unabated in their hegemonic trajectory? Do the emerging alternatives now 
make it impossible to return to traditional work? Is there some form of amalgam 
that we should seek? These are complex questions, and discussions should remain 
open. However, we may draw several conclusions from the preceding discussion that 
may serve as useful entries into the dialogue.
At the outset, I find myself compelled by the various arguments seeding the 
discursive turn in social analysis. To be sure, the chief outcomes of historical and 
psychological scholarship are bodies of discourse—books, articles, lectures, and the 
like. The extent to which these bodies of discourse are referentially linked to events 
outside language must always remain in question; word-object relations are forever 
in motion (“infinite semiosis”), and words themselves are easily objectified even 
when there are no ostensible referents. Further, when we attempt to describe the 
world to which discourse could be linked, we again enter the corridors of discourse. 
To be sure, we may deconstruct this line of reasoning by resorting to its own
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forms of argument. However, such an act of deconstruction, though certainly valid, 
simultaneously reasserts the intelligibility of the discursive arguments.
With this said, however, we do not locate within the discursive orientation any 
foundational arguments against the preceding lines of investigation. Unlike the 
empirically based traditions, there is no presumption that research may proceed in 
an unbiased way to reveal what is (or was) the case. Thus, there is no means of 
discrediting a particular form of inquiry because it fails to participate within the 
paradigm (e.g., because it fails to employ traditional canons of evidence). Rather 
than ruling out forms of inquiry, then, the discursive scholar should ideally welcome 
a range of possible endeavors, each of which would speak for a given community, its 
traditions and values. The aim should not be to obliterate traditions of language but 
to enrich them. At the same time, we are sensitized by the logic of discursive inquiry 
to the potential effects of our study on intellectual, political, and societal life more 
generally. Thus, while not discrediting any particular form of study out of hand, we 
should explore the societal implications of all our inquiries, whether oriented around 
psychological process, historical analysis, or discursive process. To publish work 
without preliminary attention to the moral and political implications within one’s 
cultural/historical context would, from the discursive standpoint, be arrogant if not 
inhumane.
What seems favored in the end is a dialogic marriage among equals. With no 
ultimate grounds of dismissal on any side, it may also be possible to appreciate the 
interdependencies of these various forms of inquiry, along with complementarities 
and potential affinities. With respect to interdependency, for example, with all its 
critique of objectively accurate analysis, discursive inquiry must indeed rely on the 
rhetoric of objectivity to render its analyses intelligible. Concerning complementarity, 
analyses favoring both the social constitution and discursive construction of the 
mind do tend to privilege social change over stability (liberal and transformative 
agendas over conservative). However, it is very unlikely that any analyst would favor 
a complete overhauling of all societal investments; absolute change would be the 
equivalent of absolute chaos. Transformation is possible only against the backdrop of 
a deep stability. And finally, there are opportunities for coalescence. For example, 
there is a high degree of overlap between the social constitutionalist and the discur­
sive constructionist efforts. With the former shifting the emphasis from psychological 
states to culturally situated performances, and the latter embedding discourse within 
embodied actions, a powerful form of historical analysis would be consolidated. 
Perhaps within intellectual life, polygamy will prove a superior cultural form to 
monogamy.
NOTES
1. See Levy (1989) and Modell (1989) for discussions of some of these limitations.
2. For more extended discussion of the emergence of social constructionism, see my 1994 
volume. Realities and Relationships. For a detailed analysis of the position of historical analysis 
within these debates, see Novick (1989).
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